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REMARKS BY GRAEME DINWOODIE∗ 
ROBERTA:  I think we're ready to start the second panel on 
this very interesting conference.   
PROFESSOR GRAEME DINWOODIE:  Thank you, Roberta. 
I am going to comment on several developments in this area in 
common law systems, and then try and relate those comments 
to the ALI proposal that we have been discussing.  It is impor-
tant, as we assess the ALI proposal, to look at what the alterna-
tives are -- and one obvious alternative is the current system.  
Whatever criticisms might be made of the ALI proposal, one has 
to bear in mind is that we should not compare the proposal to 
some perfect, pristine, model of certainty that presently exists; 
the current system is far from perfect, and certainty is not one 
of its hallmarks. 
First, I agree with both Rochelle and François that this topic 
can really only be addressed by looking at all of the different 
components of what Rochelle called the “jigsaw puzzle” of pri-
vate international law, namely, jurisdiction, choice of law or 
applicable law, and recognition of judgments.  One of the major 
advantages that the ALI proposal has over the initial Hague 
project is that it does address all three of those issues.  I under-
stand why the Hague proposal was different; relevant political 
forces led to the particular structure of a mixed convention 
without choice of law.  And I also understand the political cli-
mate in which the Europeans adopted the Brussels Convention, 
the double convention dealing with jurisdiction and judgments 
but not choice of law.  But the dynamics between choice of law 
and jurisdiction and enforcement are very, very important in 
coming to a solution that allows us to deal efficiently with 
multi-territorial disputes.  Including choice of law in this dis-
cussion is thus absolutely vital, and I think that having us ad-
dress that topic is in itself a great contribution that we can at-
tribute to the ALI project. 
  
 ∗ Professor of Law, Associate Dean, and Director, Program in Intellec-
tual Property Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law.  Thanks to the staff of the 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law for assistance with the transcription of 
my remarks, and to Sam Murumba for the invitation to a fascinating confer-
ence. 
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Unfortunately, however, intellectual property lawyers have 
never thought all that consciously, maybe even not all that sub-
consciously, about the separation of these three different com-
ponents of private international law.  Private international 
lawyers do so all the time, but in the past intellectual property 
lawyers didn't.  In part, that’s because intellectual property 
lawyers almost never thought about private international law 
at all until the early 1990s.  There wasn't much of a developed 
body of scholarship that would have assisted in maintaining a 
clear separation.  Indeed, when you look at the leading interna-
tional intellectual property cases and at some of the relevant 
doctrines that have developed in recent years, the tests used to 
determine questions of adjudicative jurisdiction are very similar 
to some of the tests used to determine applicable law.  These 
questions do converge, but I think it is very important for us to 
keep them separate. 
Notwithstanding the lack of real attention to the private in-
ternational law implications of intellectual property, there were 
doctrines in the common law intellectual property systems that 
operated in a variety of ways to act like private international 
law doctrines.  They all flowed from the principle of territorial-
ity, about which several people have already spoken.  Most con-
flicts scholars would take the question of territoriality to be a 
principal focus of their discipline, even though intellectual prop-
erty lawyers did not think about it in those terms. 
As Sam said, the principle of territoriality goes as far back as 
the Paris and Berne Conventions in the 1880s, when it was 
firmly ensconced as a core principle of international intellectual 
property law.  The principle was more recently reiterated by 
effective incorporation of the Paris and Berne Conventions in 
the TRIPS Agreement ten years ago.  Putting historical expla-
nations aside, however, the principle of territoriality is in fact 
an underlying principle of a lot of law.  Intellectual property law 
is not unique in having a territorial component.  And I think it’s 
important to bear in mind that there’s reason to support the 
principle on grounds of both principle and pragmatism. But we 
might re-assess our commitment to the historical principle dif-
ferently when we look separately at those two considerations of 
principle and pragmatism. 
Under the heading of principle, the normatively appropriate 
prescriptive authority (or reach) of states has tended histori-
cally to be defined by territory.  Put another way, the prescrip-
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tive interest of the state largely stopped at its borders.  The 
Internet, the topic of our conference, arguably has changed that 
notion of the appropriate prescriptive authority of the state. 
But there are a couple of easy traps into which one can fall in 
trying to define appropriate prescriptive authority in the Inter-
net-era.  It’s too easy to assume that, because of the ubiquity of 
the Internet, all interests that were nationally-defined suddenly 
become global in nature.  That’s a very easy -- and dangerous -- 
trap into which to fall.  First, we might not, as a normative 
matter, like the notion of all interests being defined globally.  
We might think there is some value proactively in creating a 
culture in which there is a positive value given to difference.  
And therefore we might want to resist this idea that the reach 
of a state’s interest should now operate on a global level.  And 
obviously that observation reflects a broader debate about the 
dangers and values of globalization. 
Second, although the Internet has clearly altered the scope of 
states’ legitimate interests, and now gives states legitimate pre-
scriptive interest in areas where they previously would not have 
had them, that enlarged prescriptive authority is no longer ex-
clusive.  It’s more often shared. States may previously have 
thought that the territoriality principle gave them exclusive 
authority to act in a particular sphere without having to take 
account of other states’ interests.  This is not so true now.  
States surely can now act legitimately in a larger number of 
less territorially-confined areas, but they also have to take 
greater account of the interests of competing states.  We should 
bear in mind these kinds of considerations of principle -- that is 
to say, the actual prescriptive authority that we might want to 
accord to states -- as we construct any system. 
Earlier, I said that, in addition to considerations of principle, 
territoriality reflected pragmatism or practicality.  Private in-
ternational law is really all about practicality, about enforcing 
rights, as I think Graeme Austin commented at the WIPO Fo-
rum a couple of years ago.  Issues of enforcement, effective en-
forcement, and certainty for actors in the commercial sphere, 
are all relevant.. 
Obviously the Internet is changing this consideration as well, 
because an online actor is less certain than his offline col-
leagues about the legal regimes to which his conduct is going to 
be subjected.  Practical certainty is an important consideration, 
and you see some of that reflected in the ALI project.  So, for 
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example, when Rochelle was talking about the considerations 
that the current draft lists as relevant to when we might want 
to consolidate cases in a single court, these were very practical-
ity-oriented considerations.  The ALI project appropriately 
takes practical considerations into account. 
But we must also think about the first consideration that I 
mentioned, namely, questions of principle.  So how should we 
reconfigure territoriality in the climate of the Internet? 
The proposition with which Sam started, and which both Ro-
chelle and François endorsed, and that no one since has dis-
puted, is that intellectual property law is territorial.  But that 
proposition masks a variety of different sub-propositions.  There 
are different parts of intellectual property law that have a terri-
torial dimension, and it’s worth separating them in order to 
work out where we are focusing in today’s discussion. 
First, you can say that the scope of intellectual property 
rights is territorial.  In use-based trademark law systems, for 
example, the scope of a trademark owner’s rights only goes so 
far as the goodwill that attaches to its mark.  Similarly, the 
British copyright statute says that the copyright owner has the 
exclusive right to do and to authorize the defined acts with re-
spect to its work in the United Kingdom.  Rights are territorial. 
Territoriality also affects the legal norms or the rules that are 
applicable in intellectual property disputes.  We have national 
intellectual property laws; we have territorial laws. 
We also have national systems (or territorial systems) of en-
forcement.  Courts generally have adjudicative authority de-
fined, among other things, by territory.  Indeed, historically, 
common law courts have restricted their adjudication of intel-
lectual property matters to activities occurring within their ter-
ritory and to activities respecting rights conferred with respect 
to that territory. 
Finally, you have territoriality of acquisition mechanisms.  
When we're dealing with rights that require registration or ap-
plication to secure protection – so we are talking mostly about 
industrial property regimes – acquisition procedures operate on 
a territorial basis.  There are mechanisms, such as the Madrid 
Protocol or Hague design agreement, designed to facilitate the 
acquisition of territorial (national) rights on a multinational 
basis,.  And the Community Trademark has made the proposi-
tion less absolute.  But even these examples are essentially 
grounded in the territorial model. 
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Our discussion today has focused on the national enforcement 
model.  But what changes we make with respect to the national 
enforcement model will affect those other issues.  And what we 
do by way of consolidation will affect, I'll suggest in a minute, 
what we might do in choice of law.  Similarly, one of the things 
that could be done to ameliorate some of the problems of multi-
territorial enforcement would be to have systems for acquiring 
rights that made it easier to secure rights on a broader geo-
graphic scale.  As I mentioned, we have some mechanisms in 
the industrial property area that allow us to do that, and there-
fore ameliorate to some extent problems of enforcement that are 
greater in the copyright area.  I'm going to talk now about the 
territorial enforcement model because I think another great con-
tribution of the ALI project is to start a discussion about con-
solidation in intellectual property cases.  But I stress that 
changes in the enforcement context are going to operate dy-
namically with these other aspects of the territoriality model. 
First, I’ll sketch some of the common law doctrines that 
courts have begun to develop in order to deal with some of the 
problems we have been discussing.  This will be valuable, I 
hope, because, as I said at the beginning, we have to measure 
the ALI proposals against real-life alternatives to fairly assess 
the contribution that those proposals might make. 
The doctrines that different common law countries use to im-
plement a territorial approach to enforcement sometimes have 
different names, but they operate in largely the same way.  In 
copyright law, there remains a pretty strong commitment to the 
principle that laws do not operate extraterritorially.  Certainly 
in the United States it is a mantra that copyright courts repeat 
with some regularity.  However, the US courts have developed 
theories or devices by which they have been able to apply 
American law to activity that occurs either wholly or partly 
abroad.  For example, US courts have said that if an infringing 
act in the United States enables further infringements abroad, 
a plaintiff can sue in the United States and obtain relief (obtain 
damages, or in the Ninth Circuit now, just profits) for the activ-
ity both in the US and abroad.  This doctrine has a variety of 
names.  Some people call it the root copy theory.  Other people 
call it the predicate act theory.  But it’s a theory that’s been ac-
cepted both by the Second Circuit (for 60 years) and the Ninth 
Circuit for a couple of years.  I would say that it is now a major-
ity theory throughout the US, and also serves as a way of apply-
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ing a single law, American law – we shall get back to that point 
later – to essentially what is a transnational problem. 
Moreover, once courts started thinking about copyright choice 
of law rules in the 1990s, those rules became quite flexible -- 
and flexible is the polite term for manipulable.  This flexibility 
allows courts to localize what are essentially transnational acts 
within the United States.  But an important point here is that 
choice of law rules sometimes don't come bearing that label.  
You do of course get choice of law rules that are announced as 
such.  The leading case in the United States is Itar-Tass in the 
Second Circuit from 1998.  There, the Second Circuit said that, 
in determining the ownership of a copyright to be enforced in 
the United States courts, we will apply the law of the most sig-
nificant relationship to the parties and the transaction.  That is 
in essence the test from the second restatement of conflicts.  
The court looked especially to the factors of the authors’ nation-
ality (in that case, Russia) and place of first publication (which 
was also Russian).  It thus applied Russian ownership rules to 
determine who owned the copyright that would then be en-
forced in the United States with respect to US infringing acts.  
On whether the acts occurring in the United States were in-
fringing, the court essentially applied the lex loci delicti.  Al-
though the court nominally defined its approach as interest 
analysis, it came very close to applying lex loci delicti. The place 
of publication was New York and so they applied US law to the 
question of infringement. 
This approach is perhaps unduly flexible.  The most signifi-
cant relationship test can allow you very easily to localize acts 
that are essentially transnational disputes within one country, 
and there will often be several localization options.  And the 
same is true regardless whether the law applicable to infringe-
ment is determined by a general interest-based, or policy-based, 
approach rather that the traditional lex loci delicti approach.  
There are simply too many potential loci delicti online. 
I said earlier that there are rules that operate as choice of law 
rules but are not labeled as such.  What I'm thinking of here are 
instances in which the US courts have defined key concepts 
that are relevant to an essential element of the intellectual 
property cause of action.  So, for example, to establish a viola-
tion of the public performance right of the copyright owner, the 
plaintiff must show that the work has been performed. How you 
define performance will affect whether or not you can localize 
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and establish a cause of action under one set of laws as opposed 
to another.  So, in a Ninth Circuit case where there was a satel-
lite transmission from the United States to Canada, the Court 
held that a performance occurred only where the signal was 
received.  That was in Canada, so we didn't have a performance, 
and we didn't have a cause of action under US copyright law.  
The Second Circuit, in contrast, in National Football League 
versus Primetime 24, disagreed and held that every single step 
in the process from the uplink of a signal to the reception can be 
a performance within the meaning of the statutory term.  Tech-
nically, the solution to this question was not cast as a choice of 
law rule.  The courts were seeking to define the substantive 
right of the copyright owner.  But that interpretation of “per-
formance” essentially allowed the Second Circuit to localize al-
most any satellite transmission it wants in the US -- either it 
goes from the United States or comes into the United States.  
So there is a manipulable choice of law rule embedded in this 
substantive concept. The WIPO Standing Committee in Trade-
mark has adopted a Recommendation about the concept of Use 
on the Internet that likewise effectively operates as a choice of 
law rule, even though it is also cast as a set of substantive rules 
of trademark law.  I think Annette Kur may talk about the Rec-
ommendation this afternoon. 
Increased flexibility for copyright litigants can also be seen 
outside the choice of law context.  Recently, US courts have in-
dicated a willingness to allowed claims under foreign copyright 
laws to be tried in the US courts.  This time, the courts are re-
specting the foreign law.  They are applying the foreign law, but 
are still modifying the territorial model of enforcement.  The 
most notable example of this is the Boosey and Hawkes case 
from the Second Circuit in 1998 where the Second Circuit re-
versed a district court decision saying that as a matter of forum 
non conveniens doctrine, it was not convenient to have to apply 
eighteen foreign copyright laws.  And the Second Circuit, not 
being a trial court, said the district court would be just fine ap-
plying eighteen foreign copyright laws, and thus shouldn't have 
dismissed the case under forum non conveniens. 
So even in the absence of a treaty and without the ALI pro-
ject, you can see, particularly in the last six years in New York, 
that the Second Circuit has endorsed efforts to move beyond the 
national model of enforcement. 
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As a caveat to such flexibility, take note of a slightly aberrant 
Ninth Circuit decision, Creative Technologies versus Aztec.  
There, the Court dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds 
what was in large part an American copyright claim and part of 
a dispute between two American subsidiaries of Singapore com-
panies.  The Court allowed the case to be litigated instead in 
Singapore on the grounds, in part, that the plaintiff could al-
ways sue in Singapore for the American copyright infringement.  
So, although US courts may be more willing to adjudicate for-
eign claims in the United States, the quid pro quo might be the 
possibility that foreign courts might likewise adjudicate Ameri-
can copyright claims.  This reinforces my earlier observation 
regarding the phenomenon of shared prescriptive authority. 
Trademark law has not undergone quite the same changes as 
copyright law.  In trademark litigation, there is still substantial 
resistance to adjudicating foreign trademark claims or protect-
ing foreign trademark rights.  The most notable example in the 
last couple of years is the Barcelona.com case in the Fourth Cir-
cuit.  The reasons for that resistance are essentially twofold.  
First, it is thought that to adjudicate foreign trademark claims 
would involve passing on the validity of the act of administra-
tive officials of the other state, i.e., the trademark-granting offi-
cials, and thus violate principles of comity.  Second, it is argued 
that domestic courts lack judicial competence to apply foreign 
trademark law.  These arguments appear, to me, to be unper-
suasive.  Although assessment of factual issues such as con-
sumer understanding might come more naturally to domestic 
courts, the application of trademark law is hardly so much 
harder than the application of copyright law.  The challenge in 
the trademark context is how to minimize the substantial fac-
tual differences between claims under different foreign laws 
rather than worrying about judicial competence. 
While there has been this reluctance in US courts to adjudi-
cate foreign trademark claims, there has not been a parallel 
reluctance to apply American trademark law to almost any dis-
pute that can be adjudicated in the US courts.  Some of this as-
sertiveness has been prompted by the in rem jurisdiction of the 
Anti-Cybersquatting Act.  This jurisdiction provision allows 
plaintiffs to litigate a cybersquatting dispute in the Eastern 
District of Virginia if you’re in the dot com or dot org domains, if 
the court has no in personam jurisdiction over the domain name 
registrant-defendant.  But even in in personam actions under 
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the cybersquatting statute, American courts have denied forum 
non conveniens motions in cases that appear to be largely for-
eign.  And trademark law does apply extraterritorially under 
the Lanham Act in a range of defined circumstances, unlike 
copyright law. 
It is good to see patent law in the ALI project. The Internet 
has raised a smaller number of patent law issues, because 
Internet activity appeared at first to implicate few patent 
rights.  But to the extent that we move towards acceptance of 
business method patents, we could expect to see some of the 
same problems arise in patent law. 
So that’s where things stand at the moment in patent, copy-
right and trademark law in the common law system.  What fur-
ther developments might we want to see either through the 
modification of those doctrines or in the ALI project? First, let’s 
consider the extent to which we differentiate the treatment of 
copyright, on the one hand, from patent and trademark, on the 
other, in adjudicating foreign claims.  As I said, the reasons for 
more caution with respect to patent and trademark claims are a 
hesitation before passing on the validity of a foreign right and a 
belief that our judges simply do not have the competence to ap-
ply foreign or trademark or foreign patent laws. I've never been 
persuaded by the mighty offense that foreign nations would suf-
fer.  Given the nature of the act – it takes a small amount of 
time to determine whether to grant a trademark registration – 
is it really to be regarded as a fundamental act of the state?  In 
an era where we have to come to some compromise on the exer-
cise of shared authority, can't we compromise on that issue? 
The competence issue surely suggests some degree of arro-
gance on the part of intellectual property lawyers.  Do we really 
think that what we do is so tough that no one else in another 
country could possibly understand it?  There are very fine judi-
cial networks now established among intellectual property 
judges of different countries.  On a regular basis, judges meet 
each other, they lecture to each other, they communicate with 
each other at conferences.  Intellectual property judges may 
know more about the intellectual property laws of other coun-
tries than most of the non-intellectual property judges in those 
other countries.  There’s a fair case to be made that a British or 
German patent judge could apply American patent law as 
knowledgably as a district court judge in the United States.  
And I say that with all due respect to district court judges who 
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don't maybe get as many of those cases as would be necessary to 
develop expertise.  And public law harmonization of trademark 
laws has probably also made the judicial task a bit easier be-
cause the basic issues in trademark law are largely common 
throughout the world. 
Moreover, as I said earlier, we must compare the consolida-
tion provisions in the ALI proposal to existing litigation models.  
How does the ALI proposal compare to litigants suing serially, 
country by country?  Subject to the Second Circuit’s modifica-
tions in copyright, this is what will otherwise occur.  Clearly, in 
theory, costs and uncertainties are reduced by litigating in a 
single court.  But that might only be in theory.  In the last six 
years the courts have allowed several foreign copyright claims 
to proceed.  However, almost none of those cases went to trial.  
There are substantial complexities involved in trying cases un-
der eighteen foreign laws.  If costs savings are to be real, there 
might be a temptation to simplify the proceedings.   If a trial 
judge recognizes that because a work has been published in 140 
countries on the Internet, she has the prospect of trying a case 
under 140 different laws, the application of forum (American) 
law may be very attractive.  If forum law looks similar to the 
Italian or French or other potentially applicable laws, there 
may be a temptation to apply a single law in order to realize the 
efficiencies that we're trying to achieve through consolidation in 
a single court. That’s a temptation that we at least need to be 
aware of, because there may be times when application of a sin-
gle law will be inappropriate. 
In that context, I was surprised to hear François’ defense of 
territorialism in copyright.  On other occasions, I have sensed 
that, at least in the Internet context, and contrary to the protes-
tations in the ALI commentary, it would be exceptional to ad-
here to copyright territoriality under the ALI Principles. That’s 
an issue I hope we can get to during discussion. 
A second point of comparison between the ALI proposal and 
the current system of international intellectual property litiga-
tion might be the extent to which it would effect the Americani-
zation of international intellectual property law.  With respect 
to trademark law, I would argue that the ALI project might en-
courage the de-Americanization of trademark law because at 
present the US courts essentially apply American law, particu-
larly in domain-name-related disputes, to almost any case over 
which they can obtain adjudicative jurisdiction.  A system that 
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encouraged consolidation in other courts might encourage the 
development of law from elsewhere.  And even if that consolida-
tion occurred primarily in the United States, consolidation and 
liberal approaches to the adjudication of foreign claims might 
free U.S. courts to apply laws other than that of the United 
States. 
Roberta, how much time do I have left? 
ROBERTA:  Oh, five minutes. 
PROFESSOR DINWOODIE:  All right.  Moreover, whether 
under the current system or the proposed ALI system, there is 
real need for what might be called “a bit of give and take.” Steve 
Burbank has a good phrase that captures this: “Jurisdictional 
Equilibrium.”  As Creative Technology suggested (though per-
haps on the wrong facts), a jurisdictional balance will be 
achieved by courts deciding occasionally to decline jurisdiction, 
and occasionally to accept consolidated jurisdiction.  No system 
will work if every court that sees a chance to control consoli-
dated litigation grabs it.  There has to be some restraint. With 
some exceptions, the problems we are discussing are character-
ized by an excess of prescriptive (and possibly adjudicative) au-
thority.  Lack of authority is rarely the problem.  Therefore 
courts have to draw back from taking every single case that 
they can plausibly hear. 
The need for restraint is in fact something that will pervade 
any system for resolving the type of multiterritorial disputes 
that we have been discussing.  I noticed some of the general 
sentiment in the Court’s opinion in the recent Canadian Tariff 
22 litigation.  The Canadian Supreme Court said, first, that the 
Canadian legislature could enact laws that covered the foreign 
online conduct but, second, the court stressed that it would 
separately consider whether the legislature actually exercised 
that authority. That’s something you don't see as much of in US 
opinions. 
A set of rules on recognition is itself a form of restraint.  That 
is to say, if states agree to recognize judgments of other courts, 
that decision is essentially an obligation to defer from reaching 
an independent judgment on a case that domestic courts might 
otherwise be able to hear.  And so rules on recognition are an 
important part of the philosophy of restraint. 
Another context in which the philosophy of restraint will play 
out will be in devising remedies in multi-territorial disputes. In 
recent years, in a number of cases, courts have recognized that 
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limited remedies will be important to consider when dealing 
with an Internet dispute.  When relief affects the interest of 
other states, courts might have to tailor the remedy to allow 
legitimate activity in those other states to continue.  The SCT 
WIPO Standing Committee on Trademark Recommendation on 
the Concept of Use on the Internet endorses this approach.  And 
you can find it implicitly in the opinions of some US courts, 
such as the Playboy versus Chuckleberry decision of the South-
ern District of New York. 
Let me acknowledge one caveat to efforts to offer nationally-
configured relief in online disputes.  As a normative matter, 
some commentators do not like the idea of deviating in any way 
from the (purported) premise of global space that underlies the 
Internet.  Relief built upon technological measures that under-
mine the notion of global space (and impose technological man-
dates on defendants that will raise the costs of online activity) 
will be fought by some Internet advocates because of their vi-
sion of the Internet.  This is a fair concern, but so too is the re-
spect for different national intellectual property laws. 
Just two other comments as I'm running out of time.  First, in 
devising rules in the online environment, we should be careful 
not to become too Internet 2004-specific.  The Internet is not a 
constant target.  The structure of the Internet, how people act 
on the Internet, how they use domain names, keywords, and 
URLs as ways of getting around on the Worldwide Web, . . .  
these change all the time.  One of the weaknesses of the Ninth 
Circuit decision in Grokster, I believe, is attaching legal signifi-
cance to whether an index is centralized, decentralized, or dis-
persed over super-nodes without articulating the policy signifi-
cance of those different technological constructions.  So I would 
caution against building into the rules things that appear to be 
entirely specific to this current technology. 
Finally, there is the politics of all of this.  Maryellen men-
tioned that she thought these initiatives were a little bit unreal-
istic in 1997.  There are some people who think it’s still unreal-
istic. I'm definitely not one of them.  I think this is a tremen-
dous project that ALI and the reporters have undertaken.  
However, it is worth trying to explain what can be explained 
about the politics of these projects and their critics.  I believe 
that many of the unconditional critics of the ALI proposal may 
disagree with the initiative for two different, though related, 
reasons.  The first is rooted in a debate about how international 
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versus national we want our contemporary life to be.  In these 
discussions, this is indeed likely to be the more explicit basis for 
objection.  The implicit and sometimes unspoken reason may be 
that some commentators may see internationalism as a proxy 
for high or low levels of intellectual property protection. 
That is to say, although François described applicable law 
rules as “neutral concepts,” which may reflect a first Restate-
ment notion of conflicts in the United States, current American 
conflicts scholarship probably would not characterize applicable 
law rules in those terms.  Likewise, some of the critics of the 
ALI Proposal would contend that it contains a substantive bias.  
Although I am receptive to the notion that procedural rules are 
never fully neutral, I agree with Rochelle and François that the 
ALI proposal does not a substantive bias in favor of one view of 
intellectual property law.  I think the examples Rochelle used -- 
Grokster being sued both in Australia and in the United States, 
Lindows being sued in Europe after Microsoft thought that the 
result in the US litigation was not free from doubt – showed 
that a system such as envisaged by the ALI proposal can effect 
a shift that is pro-defendant as well as pro-plaintiff.  
A value we've always had in the international intellectual 
property system is the autonomy of states to determine what 
cultural values they want reflected in their intellectual property 
law.  There is value in the diversity of law. But consolidation 
may be the surest way to protect those values.  If consolidation 
of national claims in a single court is not permitted, plaintiffs 
will seek extraterritorial rulings, and they will seek to extrude 
a single law to decide transnational disputes.  If states allow 
consolidation, then courts might, subject to the temptation that 
I mentioned, respect the national laws of different states with 
legitimate interests and therefore preserve the national auton-
omy of member states.  And that is a strong argument against 
critics of the ALI project.  Thanks. 
 
 
